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Raised in Portsmouth, New Hampshire by middle-class parents, 27-year-old 
“Adam Moser was popular, adventurous, athletic, a college grad, a top fisherman 
and a World War II history buff who fluently spoke French.”1 A football star 
with the Exeter High School Blue Hawks, Moser excelled academically and 
earned his degree in Actuarial Science from Temple University in 2011. After 
college, he appeared on “Wicked Tuna, a reality television series featured by 
National Geographic, and earned a small degree of fame and fortune from the 
opportunity.”2 By all accounts, Moser had a loving family, kind friends, and a 
promising life. On September 19, 2015, much to the horror of his parents and 
loved ones, Moser unexpectedly passed away. Autopsy reports revealed a 
disturbing cause of death. Moser had self-injected a substance that he believed 
at the time of his purchase to be heroin, but what was actually its sinister cousin: 
synthetic fentanyl. This misunderstanding cost him his life. 
The story of Adam Moser relates just one among the thousands of 
heartbreaking realities brought on by America’s opioid epidemic. From 
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2019 summer clerkship at the U.S. Department of Justice. All errors are my own. 










2021  BILATERAL RESPONSE TO THE PROLIFERATION OF FENTANYL 159 
teenagers in high school hallways3 to celebrities idolized in popular culture,4 this 
crisis does not discriminate among the communities it ravages. Moser’s story 
also offers anecdotal support for the fact that opioid abuse remains a dire public 
health emergency and has visited destruction upon American5 and international 
populations alike.6 The current epidemic developed in three waves: “[t]he first 
wave was prescription opioids, the second wave was heroin, and the third—and 
ongoing—wave is synthetic opioids.”7 The unrivaled lethality of this final wave, 
and the rate at which it has accelerated, shocks the conscience.8 A 2018 study in 
the Health Policy Review conducted by six physicians explains: 
 
Data on opioid overdose deaths shows 42,000 deaths in 2016. 
Of these, synthetic opioids other than methadone were 
responsible for over 20,000, heroin for over 15,000, and 
natural and semi-synthetic opioids other than methadone 
responsible for over 14,000. Fentanyl deaths increased 520% 
from 2009 to 2016 (increased by 87.7% annually between 
2013 and 2016), and heroin deaths increased 533% from 2000 
to 2016.9 
 
The high potency of synthetic opioids, chief among them illicitly 
manufactured fentanyl (“IMF”)10 and their near-identical cousins known as 
fentanyl analogues, places them in a class all their own within the opioid family 
of narcotics.11 Between IMF and its analogues, the latter contributed most to the 
 
 
3 See, e.g., Benjamin Romano & Brendan Kiley, ‘Fentanyl is a Death Drug’: Public-Health Warning 
Issued After Pills Kill 3 Local Teens, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 5, 2019, 11:23 AM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/schools-issue-warning-after-seattle-teen-dies-
from-fentanyl-laced-pill/ (explaining that three high school teenagers in Seattle fatally overdosed on 
pills laced with illicit fentanyl, which they believed to be oxycodone). 
4 See, e.g., Daniella Silva, Prince Died After Taking Fake Vicodin Laced with Fentanyl, NBC NEWS, 
(Apr. 19, 2018, 5:36 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/no-criminal-charges-prince-s-
overdose-death-prosecutor-announces-n867491 (“Music legend Prince died after taking what he 
thought was Vicodin but was actually a counterfeit painkiller that was laced with fentanyl . . . ‘In all 
likelihood, Prince had no idea he was taking a counterfeit pill that could kill him’. . .”). 
5 See THE WHITE HOUSE, Ending America’s Opioid Crisis (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/opioids/ 
(declaring a public health emergency because 64,000 Americans died from opioid overdoses in 2016). 
6 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Information Sheet on Opioid Overdose (Aug. 28, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/substance_abuse/information-sheet/en/ (declaring that in 2016 275 million 
people worldwide used drugs, 34 million of those used opioids, 27 million suffered from opioid abuse 
disorders (addiction), and 450,000 died from a direct result of drug overdoses). 
7 BRYCE PARDO ET AL., THE FUTURE OF FENTANYL AND OTHER SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS, RAND Corp. xv 
(2019). 
8 See Leo Beletsky & Corey Davis, Today’s Fentanyl Crisis: Prohibition’s Iron Law Revisited, 46 INT’L 
J. DRUG POL’Y 156 (2017). 
9 Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., Reframing the Prevention Strategies of the Opioid Crisis: Focusing on 
Prescription Opioids, Fentanyl, and Heroin Epidemic, 20 HEALTH POL’Y REV. 309 (2018) (emphasis 
added). 
10 This Note addresses the need to combat illicit fentanyl from a law enforcement perspective. 
Contrariwise, licit fentanyl, as prescribed and administered by licensed medical practitioners consistent 
with their best practices, finds no criticism here. See What is Fentanyl, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose /opioids/fentanyl.html (“. . . the sharp 
rise in fentanyl-related deaths may be due to increased availability of illegally made, non-
pharmaceutical fentanyl, and not prescribed fentanyl.”). 
11 See The Countdown: Fentanyl Analogues & The Expiring Emergency Scheduling Order: Hearing 
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recent spike in opioid overdose deaths.12 These analogues, primarily concocted 
by chemists overseas, eventually find their way to American shores through 
international narcotrafficking channels. According to the U.S. Department of 
Justice (“DOJ” or “Main Justice”), “China is the principal source country of 
fentanyl-like substances and other synthetic opioids, producing most illicit 
fentanyl and fentanyl-like substances that reach U.S. users.”13 Nonetheless, 
current efforts to hold China accountable for turning a blind eye to fentanyl 
diversion have largely failed.  
Despite reinvigorated efforts by the DEA to quell domestic distribution of 
IMF and its analogues, the United States cannot make lasting progress in 
counternarcotics without international cooperation.14 Consequently, an effective 
strategy to combat the opioid crisis must be international in scope and tailored 
to address IMF and analogue trafficking from their primary source: Chinese 
manufacturers. Therefore, although the Trump Administration has won a series 
of praiseworthy battles in what has become a years-long war against the 




Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“The lethality of fentanyl is virtually unmatched. It is 30-50 times 
more potent than heroin, which is quite lethal in its own right.”); Rachel L. Rothberg & Kate Stith, 
Fentanyl: A Whole New World, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 314 (2018) (“Fentanyl . . . is fifty times more 
potent than heroin and one hundred times more so than morphine. It is so dangerous that . . . first 
responders who unknowingly come into contact with it . . . can be put at serious risk.”). See also Erika 
Kinetz & Paisley Dodds, Deadly Drug Fentanyl Has Been Tested as Chemical Weapon by Military for 
Decades, GLOBAL NEWS, (Oct. 8, 2016, 11:16 AM), https://globalnews.ca/news/2991712/deadly-
drug-fentanyl-has-been-tested- as-chemical-weapon-by-military-for-decades/. 
12 See Harold E. Schueler, Emerging Synthetic Fentanyl Analogs, ACADEMIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 
(2017) (“Synthetic fentanyl analogs are the most potent substances to enter the illicit drug market.”). 
See also Lawrence Scholl et al., Drug and Opioid-Involved Opioid Deaths—United States, 2013-2017, 
67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1419 (2018), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6334822/pdf/mm675152e1.pdf (“From 2016 to 
2017, overdose deaths involving all opioids and synthetic opioids increased, but deaths involving 
prescription opioids and heroin remained stable. The opioid overdose epidemic continues to worsen 
and evolve because of the continuing increase in deaths involving synthetic opioids.”). 
13 Liskamm, supra note 11, at 5. See also Liz Schrayer, We Can’t Fight Our Opioid Crisis Alone. We 
Need Help from Countries Around the World, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2018, 2:11 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/08/02/fighting-american-opioid-crisis-international-
help-needed-column/850333002/ (“Most fentanyl in America comes from China.”); Illicit Supply of 
Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids: Transitioning Markets and Evolving Challenges: Testimony 
Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec. Subcomm. on Intelligence and Counterterrorism and Subcomm. 
on Border Sec., Facilitation, and Operations, 116th Cong. 9 (2018) (statement by Bryce Pardo, RAND 
Corp.) (“Currently, U.S. authorities believe China to be the primary source for fentanyl, fentanyl 
analogues, precursor chemicals, and press machines used in the manufacture of counterfeit tablets.”). 
See also Alex W. Palmer, The China Connection, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Oct. 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/16/magazine/china-fentanyl-drug-ring.html (“China remains the 
center of the global fentanyl economy”). 
14 Schrayer, supra note 13 (“When it comes to combating the opioid epidemic, we simply don’t have the 
luxury of battling this crisis on the homefront alone.”); See also Christopher Battiloro, Note, Fentanyl: 
How China’s Pharmaceutical Loopholes are Fueling the Opioid Crisis, 46 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & 
COM. 343-44 (2019) (“The root of the opioid crisis lies in China, where synthetic opioids and their 
precursors are manufactured before being shipped overseas. While some changes are being made 
domestically, thanks to the internet, this issue has no borders and cannot be unilaterally controlled.”). 
15 See Manchikanti et al., supra note 9, at 317 (“In recent years, prescription opioid usage has decreased 
with the development of a multitude of federal, state, and local regulations.”). But see Jeffrey Miron, 
Greg Sollenberger & Laura Nicolae, Overdosing on Regulation: How Government Caused the Opioid 
Epidemic, THE CATO INST. (2019), (explaining opioid prescription regulations pushed consumers to 
black market dealers at their peril and suggests “that the United States should scale back restrictions 
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This Note addresses the international legal landscape of the opioid 
epidemic, specifically illicit transboundary trafficking of fentanyl and fentanyl 
analogues from chemists in China into the hands of American consumers. First, 
it assesses the seriousness of the opioid crisis, as exacerbated by emerging 
threats posed by IMF and related analogues. Second, it offers an explanative 
account of current domestic law enforcement efforts to address fentanyl by the 
United States and China respectively. This explanation precedes a short 
discussion that relates the successes and failures of each regime in their efforts 
to combat narcotrafficking. Third, this Note evaluates the inability of extant 
multinational drug conventions to effectively address transboundary fentanyl 
trafficking from China. Finally, it proposes that the United States and China 
adopt a bilateral self-executing treaty that would class-wide schedule IMF and 
its analogues consistent with the policy announced by China in May 2019 and 
as advocated by counsel at the DOJ. This Note contends that such a proposal 
would grant the DOJ new jurisdiction to prosecute known Chinese chemists who 






Although opioid abuse has existed for several decades, the recent escalation 
in opioid addiction began after influential pharmaceutical companies prevailed 
in their campaign to bring opiate painkillers to medical facilities in the 1990s.16 
According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse (“NIDA”), opioids primarily 
affect areas of the brain that control pleasure, pain, and emotion, and they 
stimulate dopamine releases responsible for the euphoria experienced by 
recreational users.17 These experiences inevitably become less satisfying as the 
brain acclimates to the drug over time.18 Consequently, users will crave stronger 
doses with continued opioid use and eventually become addicted.19 A linear 
trajectory exists between individuals who become addicted to prescription 
painkillers (acquired licitly by prescription or illicitly through diversion) and 
those addicted to illegal opiates. Indeed, prescription opioid abuse often 
precedes an addiction to heroin20 and, if allowed to progress, synthetic opioids 
 
 
16 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., What is the U.S Opioid Epidemic? (last updated Sept. 
4, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html (explaining big pharmaceutical 
companies “reassured the medical community that patients would not become addicted to opiate pain 
relievers” which precipitated a rise in prescriptions and, accordingly, more cases of addiction).   
17 See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, How Do Opioids Affect the Brain and Body (last visited Nov. 23, 
2019), https://www.drug abuse.gov/publications/misuse-prescription-drugs/what-classes-
prescription-drugs-are-commonly-misused (“When [opiates] attach to their receptors, they inhibit the 
transmission of pain signals. Opioids can also produce . . . nausea, constipation, and respiratory 
depression, and since these drugs also act on brain regions involved in reward, they can induce 
euphoria, particularly when they are taken at a higher-than-prescribed dose . . .”). 
18 Id. 
19 See generally E. Salsitz & T. Wiegand, Pharmacotherapy of Opioid Addiction: Putting a Real Face 
on a False Demon, 12 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY 58-63 (2016).  
20 See Shelby Leheny, The Connection Between Prescription Opioids and Heroin, PHARMACY TIMES 









162 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.  vol. XI:1 
like fentanyl and its analogues.21 Therefore, some scholars have attributed 
America’s high demand for IMF to recent spikes in opioid prescriptions.22   
 Before IMF and its analogues can be sold domestically and consumed, 
they must be manufactured, diverted, and—in most cases—internationally 
trafficked. According to the DEA, the “vast majority” of IMF originates with 
licensed chemists in China.23 Many of these suppliers are gainfully employed at 
legitimate taxpaying chemical companies, many of which receive praise from 
the Chinese government.24 These entities divert large quantities of fentanyl and 
drug ‘precursors’—substances used to enhance or create narcotics—into the 
hands of dark web retailers.25 Ben Westhoff describes transactions in these 
forums as “shockingly easy” to negotiate.26 Westhoff, an investigative journalist, 
disguised himself under an online alias and contacted several Chinese sellers on 
the dark web about purchasing underground fentanyl. These chemists replied 
promptly and were notably “well-accustomed to Western buyers, who are the 
bulk of their clients.”27 Once concocted in China, IMF can be trafficked into the 
United States through a variety of mediums. Mexican cartels28 and postal 
 
 
explaining that “[r]esearch has proven a connection between opioid abuse and heroin use.”); BEN 
WESTHOFF, FENTANYL, INC.: HOW ROGUE CHEMISTS ARE CREATING THE DEADLIEST WAVE OF THE 
OPIOID EPIDEMIC 145 (2019) (explaining that “when people’s OxyContin supplies ran out, they turned 
to heroin”).  
21 See Leslie Cooley Dismukes, How Did We Get Here? Heroin and Fentanyl Trafficking Trends: A Law 
Enforcement Perspective, 79 N.C. MED. J. 181-83 (2017) (explaining how a rise in prescription opioids 
precipitated a demand for heroin and later fentanyl in North Carolina). See generally Nabarun 
Dasgupta, Leo Beletsky & Daniel Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic 
Determinants, 108 A.J.P.H. PERSPECTIVES 182-84 (2018) (explaining the opioid crisis in three phases: 
over-prescription of opiate painkillers, heroin abuse, and fentanyl). 
22 Id. at 181-82. 
23 Tackling Fentanyl: The China Connection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health, 
Global Hum. Rts. and Int’l Orgs., 116th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement by Paul Knierim, Deputy Chief of 
Operations at the Office of Global Enforcement, U.S. DEA) (“Over the past several years, DEA has 
identified numerous illicit fentanyl class substances and hundreds of synthetic drugs from at least eight 
different drug classes, the vast majority of which are manufactured in China.”). See also Fentanyl 
Crisis: Is China a Major Source of Illegal Drugs?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45564744 (quoting DEA spokeswoman Katherine Pfaff who 
explained that counternarcotic intelligence indicates a “significant amount of [IMF] comes from 
China.”). See Dismukes, supra note 21, at 183 (“Clandestinely produced fentanyl and its analogues 
originate in China.”). 
24 See WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 168 (explaining, that in addition to Chinese shadow supply 
enterprises, other chemical companies which supply fentanyl to dark markets “have been able to 
operate in the open . . . in China for years. They pay their taxes and occasionally receive plaudits from 
the government.”). 
25 Rothberg & Stith, supra note 11, at 317 (explaining use of online dark markets by Chinese chemists 
to proliferate IMF). 
26 WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 171. 
27 Id. 
28 See Josh Meyer, What are Mexican Drug Cartels Fighting Over? The Chance to Sell Fentanyl Here, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/11/07/what-
are-mexican-drug-cartels-fighting-over-chance-sell-fentanyl-here/ (“More recently, according to 
DEA, CDC and United Nations data, the cartels have been spiking their U.S.-bound cocaine, 
methamphetamine and counterfeit pain pills with fentanyl, too, to pack a bigger punch and hook whole 
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smuggling,29 often facilitated by digital dark markets,30 constitute the most 
favored channels. 
Were drug smuggling an Olympic sport, Mexican cartels would bring home 
the gold. In fact, “Mexican drug cartels are the primary channel for Chinese 
fentanyl destined for the U.S.”31 Already North America’s top supplier of illicit 
heroin since the 1990s,32 “Mexican drug trafficking organizations are importing 
fentanyl and fentanyl precursors from China.”33 These distributors capitalize on 
the availability of Chinese fentanyl to handsomely profit at the peril of American 
opioid addicts. “Synthetic opioids, which can be readily made in a lab, are 
attractive alternatives to poppy-based heroin, which is susceptible to blight, 
drought, eradication, and labor shortages. Also, the very high potency-to-weight 
ratio of fentanyl makes it ideal for smuggling.”34 Moreover, “[f]entanyl is a 
unique drug in several ways. The profit margin is remarkable: A $3,000 
investment can produce $1,500,000 in earnings.”35 Consequently, Mexican 
traffickers began to supplement—or “cut”—their heroin with synthetic fentanyl 
and fentanyl analogues,36 a process which has enabled them to “stretch their 
heroin supply and obtain a larger profit.”37 Known colloquially as “China 
White,” fentanyl-heroin hybrids have proven themselves a deadly blend because 
neither street dealers nor consumers appreciate their extraordinary potency.38  
 
 
29 See Sari Horwitz & Scott Higham, The Flow of Fentanyl: In the Mail, Over the Border, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2019/08/23/fentanyl-flowed-
through-us-postal-service-vehicles-crossing-southern-border/?arc404=true. 
30 See Patil Armenian et al, Fentanyl, Fentanyl Analogs and Novel Synthetic Opioids: A Comprehensive 
Review, 134 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 121, 125 (2018) (“Modern internet e-commerce has enabled 
individual players, small-scale drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and largescale DTOs with their 
own production facilities to flood the illicit drug market with fentanyl.”). 
31 Id. at 126. See also Liskamm, supra note 11, at 1 (“Whether delivered via mail, express consignment, 
or through Mexico, China is the principal source country of fentanyl-like substances and other 
synthetic opioids, producing most illicit fentanyl and fentanyl-like substances that reach U.S. users.”). 
32 See Sarah G. Mars, Daniel Rosenblum & Daniel Ciccarone, Illicit Fentanyls in the Opioid Street 
Market: Desired or Imposed, 114 ADDICTION 780 (2018) (“Since the mid-1990s almost all US heroin 
originated in Mexico and Colombia, but between 2000 and 2009, estimated Colombian production of 
opium, the raw ingredient that is refined into heroin, fell by 90%. Meanwhile, estimated Mexican 
opium production rose by more than 1900% from its low point in 2000 to dominate the US market, 
with total production for the US market quadrupling. This rise was followed by a 46% decline in 
combined estimated opium production in 2009–13, leading up to the current US fentanyl wave.”). 
33 Pardo, supra note 13, at 9. 
34 Id.  
35 Hans A. von Spakovsky & Peyton Smith, China is Poisoning America with Fentanyl, THE HERITAGE 
FOUND. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/china-poisoning-
america-fentanyl.  
36 Knierim, supra note 23, at 1 (“Once in the Western Hemisphere, fentanyl or its analogues are prepared 
for mixing into the heroin supply. . . and then moved into the illicit U.S. market where demand for 
prescription opioids and heroin remains at epidemic proportions.”). 
37 Dismukes, supra note 21, at 183. 
38 Katarzynac Kuczyńska et al., Abuse of Fentanyl: An Emerging Problem to Face, 289 FORENSIC SCI. 
INT’L 207, 212 (2018) (“Recent years have seen an unpreceded increase in fentanyl-related 
intoxications, some fatal, in various parts of the world, but notably in North America. The majority 
have been attributed to the use of heroin laced with illicit fentanyl, a far more potent opioid. Some 
users are unaware of this adulteration, thus the risk of overdose and poisoning is very high.”). See also 
Maggie Fox, Why Would Anyone Cut Heroin with Fentanyl? It’s Cheap, These Researchers Say, NBC 
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2018, 5:45 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/why-
would-anyone-cut-heroin-fentanyl-it-s-cheap-these-n943796 (“Drug overdose deaths are skyrocketing 
. . . [and] are caused by synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. These lab-made drugs can be very potent 
and they are increasingly showing up in supplies of drugs that buyers believed were heroin. Because 
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Chinese chemists also interact directly with American consumers and street 
dealers through dark web forums and crypto markets.39 In fact, “almost 70 
percent of fentanyl seized by C[ustoms and] B[order] P[atrol] in FY 2018 arrived 
by air, mostly at mail and express consignment carrier facilities.”40 According 
to DEA, “[f]rom China, [IMF] substances are shipped primarily through express 
consignment carriers or international mail directly to the United States. . .”41 
Investigative journalist Scott Higham and Sari Horwitz, his Pulitzer Prize 
winning colleague, explained this process clearly in early 2019:  
 
Chinese drug traffickers had some advice for American buyers 
of fentanyl: Let us ship it to you by regular mail. It might be 
slower than FedEx or UPS, but the opioid is much more likely 
to reach its destination through the U.S. Postal Service. These 
cyber drug dealers wrote their U.S.-based customers—in 
emails later uncovered by federal investigators—that private 
delivery companies electronically tracked packages, allowing 
the easy identification of mail from suspect addresses and 
creating a bright trail connecting sellers and buyers of illegal 
fentanyl.42 
 
The high potency of illicit fentanyl and its analogues—to the tune of 500 
lethal doses in a parcel the size of a sugar packet—“means it can be smuggled 
through the mail in what officials call micro-shipments that are far harder to 
identify and interdict than bulkier loads of heroin, cocaine or marijuana.”43  
These facts, combined with concerted efforts by Chinese chemists to conceal 
their drug diversion schemes, illustrate the formidable challenge posed by opioid 
smuggling for U.S. customs and postal enforcement.44 Somewhat ironically, 
China cracks down on illicitly distributed fentanyl domestically, yet tacitly 
 
 
39 See generally Usha Lokala, et. al, Global Trends, Local Harms: Availability of Fentanyl-Type Drugs 
on the Dark Web and Accidental Overdoses in Ohio, 25 COMPUTATIONAL AND MATHEMATICAL ORG. 
THEORY 48-59 (2018) (examining correlations between advertising for the sale of IMF on dark crypto-
markets and increased presence of IMF in the United States). But see Mars, et al., supra note 32, at 
777 (explaining that crypto markets are unlikely to contribute to significant amounts of fentanyl 
entering the United States).  
40 Pardo, supra note 13, at 6. 
41 Knierim, supra note 23, at 1. See Palmer, supra note 13 (“The Postal Service suddenly became perhaps 
the largest drug-transportation network in the world, delivering fentanyl from China straight to 
American homes. Catching an illicit shipment in transit was nearly impossible.”). 
42 Horwitz & Higham, supra note 29. 
43 Del Quentin Wilbur, Fentanyl Smuggled from China is Killing Thousands of Americans, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 19, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-china-fentanyl-20181019-
story.html; Spakovsky & Smith, supra note 35 (“A laboratory-made drug, fentanyl requires less time 
and space to produce than its agricultural counterpart, heroin. Chemists can manufacture fentanyl in 
small labs and use easy shipment methods.”). 
44 Pardo, supra note 13, at 7 (“To avoid detection by customs authorities, Chinese producers or 
distributors often use technically legal workarounds and, when necessary, outright deception.”). See 
also Meyer, supra note 28 (“Massive amounts of fentanyl are being seized at the border now, and far 
more is getting through. Thomas Overacker, executive director of cargo and conveyance security for 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, told Congress in July that seizures of illicit fentanyl had 
significantly increased, from about two pounds in fiscal 2013 to about 2,170 pounds in fiscal 2018. 
CBP had seized as much in the first half of 2019 as it did in all of the prior year, he said, but the agency 
is able to inspect about 2 percent of cars and 16 percent of commercial vehicles that come across ports 







2021  BILATERAL RESPONSE TO THE PROLIFERATION OF FENTANYL 165 
permits its exportation to unsuspecting locations around the world.45 Therefore, 
the Chinese government has not only allowed synthetic opioid proliferation, but 
the regime’s lax enforcement policies have also enabled it.46 
 
 
III. DOMESTIC EFFORTS AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
 
A. THE UNITED STATES 
 
The United States currently regulates fentanyl proper (excluding analogues) 
as a Schedule II narcotic under the 1970 Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”). 
The CSA, a law swiftly enforced by federal authorities and their international 
partners, has been used to quash previous outbreaks of illicit fentanyl in the 
United States before they could reach epidemic magnitude.47 The enumerated 
classification of fentanyl as a controlled substance under Schedule II authorizes 
DEA action. However, America’s opioid crisis has been fueled more by fentanyl 
analogues than the original drug. While fentanyl itself has been permanently 
scheduled as a controlled substance under the CSA, its analogues have only been 
temporarily scheduled under Schedule I. Should Congress allow this temporary 
scheduling order to lapse in May 2021, the legal authority under which analogue 
traffickers may be prosecuted would no longer exist. As Amanda Liskamm, 
counsel for the Director of the Opioid Prevention Unit of the Criminal Division 
at the DOJ, explained to the U.S. Senate during the summer of 2019:  
 
DEA expects savvy clandestine manufactures and traffickers 
to respond to the reemerging gap in U.S. law by again 
producing novel fentanyl-like substances. This is the normal 
response of traffickers who wish to avoid prosecution and still 
profit from peddling poison, and is consistent with previous 
attempts to circumvent reactive substance-specific control 
measures.48 
 
Before Congress temporarily scheduled fentanyl analogues in 2020, DOJ 
responded to “savvy clandestine manufacturers and traffickers” with an 
emergency scheduling order in 2018.49 This order, as authorized by the 1984 
 
 
45 WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 170. 
46 Spakovsky & Smith, supra note 35 (“China’s inadequate regulation of drugs has left room for an 
estimated 160,000 chemical companies there with the ability to produce and export fentanyl.”). See 
also WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 206-208 (explaining how the Chinese government has conferred tax 
incentives among other benefits upon chemical companies that facilitate proliferation of illicitly 
manufactured fentanyl and fentanyl analogues). 
47 Pardo, supra note 13, at 5 (“During a brief period in the mid-2000s, illicitly manufactured fentanyl 
appeared in major heroin markets in the Midwest and mid-Atlantic, claiming about 1,000 lives. Federal 
and local response was swift, expanding access to naloxone and seizing product from the street. In 
May 2006, Mexican law enforcement and the DEA identified and closed the illicit manufacturing 
operation in Toluca, Mexico. Illicitly manufactured fentanyl would not return to drug markets until 
late 2013.”). 
48 Liskamm, supra note 11, at 4-5. 
49 Schedules of Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of Fentanyl-Related Substances in 
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Comprehensive Crime Control Act,50 temporarily scheduled fentanyl analogues 
as Schedule I controlled substances and granted DOJ authority to prosecute 
traffickers until May 2021.51 
Pursuant to this emergency order, the United States introduced a variety of 
measures to address transboundary IMF trafficking that included heightened law 
enforcement efforts coordinated by the DOJ. This crackdown enjoyed relative 
success. For example, the DOJ announced in 2018 a series of darknet website 
seizures that forestalled efforts of domestic IMF dealers and consumers to 
purchase illegal opioids and, in 2019, the DEA prosecuted a Chinese IMF ring; 
the latter event illuminated the scale and seriousness of international fentanyl 
trafficking while exposing the degree to which China has perpetuated the 
ongoing opioid epidemic.52 Furthermore, “[t]he U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has 
stepped up tracking, detection and interdiction efforts to curb fentanyl 
trafficking into the U.S. through the mail [and] . . . witnessed a 1,000% increase 
in the number of parcels seized containing synthetic opioids between 2016 and 
2018.”53  
Federal prosecutors across the United States have also ramped up their 
efforts to prosecute fentanyl traffickers, thereby sending a strong message to 
actual and would-be coconspirators that America will not sit idly while its 
citizens are poisoned with IMF and associated analogues.54 Moreover, in 2017 
the Trump Administration declared the opioid epidemic a National Health 
Emergency, a title for which the crisis “unquestionably qualifies.”55 This 
decision swept in a variety of benefits, including approval by the U.S. Food and 
 
 
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/fed_regs/rules/2018/fr0206_4.htm. See Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. 
House Passes Bill to Extend Temporary Ban on Fentanyl Look-Alikes for 15 Months, REUTERS (Jan. 
29, 2020, 7:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-drugs/u-s-house-passes-bill-to-
extend-temporary-ban-on-fentanyl-look-alikes-for-15-months-idUSKBN1ZT01Z (discussing 
congressional adoption of a temporary class-wide schedule for fentanyl analogues, effective until May 
2021). 
50 See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (1980) (providing that the Attorney General may temporarily schedule substances 
for a period of up to two years if he believes such action is appropriate and “necessary to avoid an 
imminent hazard to the public safety.”). 
51 The DEA called upon Congress to class-wide schedule all fentanyl analogues in 2020 because 
temporary scheduling could launch the DOJ into uncharted territory regarding its pending prosecutions 
under that authority. Without emergency scheduling, the DOJ would have to invoke the process 
outlined in the Analogue Act for prosecution. This process has proven too resource intensive and time 
consuming to effectively curtail the volatile fentanyl market. See Liskamm, supra note 11, at 4-6 
(“Analogue Act prosecutions are time-consuming, resource-intensive, and difficult for investigators, 
drug testing laboratories, prosecutors, courts, juries, and the entire criminal justice system.”).  
52 First Nationwide Undercover Operation Targeting Darknet Vendors Results in Arrests of More Than 
35 Individuals Selling Illicit Goods and the Seizure of Weapons, Drugs and More Than $23.6 Million, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 26, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-nationwide-undercover-
operation-targeting-darknet-vendors-results-arrests-more-35. Treasury Targets Chinese Drug 
Kingpins Fueling America’s Deadly Opioid Crisis, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm756.  
53 Celina Realuyo, Countering the Evolving Drug Trade in the Americas, WILSON CTR. 5 (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Countering%20the%20Ev
olving%20Drug%20Trade%20in%20the%20Americas.pdf.  
54 See Benjamin Glassman, Justice Department Focus on Fentanyl Yields Results in Montgomery 
County, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2019), https://www.atf.gov/news/pr/justice-department-focus-
fentanyl-yields-results-montgomery-county (explaining efforts by nine U.S. Attorneys across America 
who participated in “Operation Synthetic Opioid Surge” which specifically targeted the distribution of 
fentanyl and fentanyl-like substances pursuant to the DEA emergency scheduling order). 
55 James Hodge, Jr., Sarah Wetter, et al., Redefining Public Health Emergencies: The Opioid Epidemic, 
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Drug Administration (“FDA”) to authorize emergency use of Naxalone, 
otherwise known as Narcan, a drug which can reverse the effects of an opioid 
overdose, saving lives.56 “Absent a national emergency declaration, opioid-
related mortality may continue unabated, leading to continued loss of lives.”57 
Accordingly, the national emergency declaration at least spotlighted the opioid 
crisis in a new way that may have kickstarted life-saving reforms for real people 
plagued by addiction. 
America has also taken the fight against illicit fentanyl into the financial 
arena. The “U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) and Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
announced coordinated actions to bring additional financial pressure upon those 
who manufacture, sell, or distribute synthetic opioids or their precursor 
chemicals.”58 This approach has also enjoyed some success. For example, in 
August 2018 OFAC “targeted a massive Chinese IMF trafficking network” 
masterminded by the Zheng Family. The Zheng dynasty had a significant 
influence, trafficking deadly fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, cannabinoids, and 
cathinones to 37 U.S. States and 25 countries. Because the details of the Zheng 
Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) are essential to understanding its impact 
and scope, a summary provided by the Department of Treasury has been 
provided below: 
 
Zheng DTO manufactures and distributes hundreds of 
controlled substances, including fentanyl analogues such as 
carfentanil, acetyl fentanyl, and furanyl fentanyl.  Zheng 
created and maintained numerous websites to advertise and 
sell illegal drugs in more than 35 languages.  The Zheng DTO 
touted its ability to create custom-ordered drugs and avoid 
detection from customs and law enforcement officials when 
shipping the drugs through express mail and the U.S. Postal 
Service.  The Zheng DTO also used its chemical expertise to 
create analogues of drugs with slightly different chemical 
structures but the same or even more potent effect.  The Zheng 
DTO even agreed to manufacture adulterated cancer 
medication, creating counterfeit pills that replaced the active 
cancer-fighting ingredient with dangerous synthetic drugs.  
The Zheng DTO laundered its drug proceeds in part by using 
digital currency such as bitcoin, transmitted drug proceeds into 
and out of bank accounts in China and Hong Kong, and 
bypassed currency restrictions and reporting requirements.59 
 
OFAC enabled federal law enforcement to crack down on this international 
conspiracy and put an end to the Zheng enterprise. FinCEN has also proven a 
valuable tool in America’s domestic efforts to quash the opioid epidemic 
because it releases reports, formally known as “advisories”, that synthesize the 
financial transactions of suspected chemists and traffickers. This information 
 
 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 13.  
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may be used to identify patterns of suspicious behavior that can help federal 
agents and prosecutors to identify perpetrators and bring them to justice. These 
advisories, “which also serve[] as the monetary advisory on the financial aspects 
of the illicit trafficking of fentanyl and synthetic opioids, provide information 
relevant for financial institutions to gain a more comprehensive understanding 
of the fentanyl crisis and take action to protect the homeland from this deadly 
threat.”60 Therefore, the United States has in recent months taken comprehensive 




Motivated in part by a recent series of economic tariffs,61 China has taken 
several steps to combat the opioid epidemic. First, effective May 1, 2019, China 
class-wide scheduled fentanyl analogues, a policy shift that subjected purveyors 
of IMF and similar substances to harsh prosecution by the Chinese 
government.62 This decision arose amid unsuccessful efforts by the DOJ to 
secure class-wide scheduling of fentanyl analogues in the United States,63 and 
has been applauded by drug enforcement officials at the White House.64 Later, 
in November 2019, China joined forces with the United States in an 
unprecedented collaborative effort to prosecute nine perpetrators affiliated with 
an IMF trafficking ring based in China.65  
 Second, the Chinese government has instituted new supervisory 
measures for domestic narcotics distributors. “Following a tightening of drug 
controls that took effect May 1, the [Chinese] government put 91 manufacturers 
and 234 individual distributors under ‘strict supervision,’ warning them not to 
export fentanyl or related drugs . . .”66 This heightened supervision has deterred 
some illicit providers from trafficking IMF to potential international customers, 
including prospective buyers in the United States.67 Moreover, China’s National 
Narcotics Control Commission (“NNCC”), “reports that Chinese authorities 
have arrested ‘dozens’ of synthetic drug exporters, confiscated eight illegal labs, 
 
 
60 Id.  
61 James Mayger & Zhe Huang, China Touts Fentanyl Convictions, Tackling Key Trade Talks Issue, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 6, 2019, 9:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-
07/china-punishes-fentanyl-smugglers-after-joint-probe-with-u-s.  
62 Liskamm, supra note 11, at 1-2.  
63 Id. at 3-5. 
64 Tackling the Opioid Crisis: A Whole-of-Government Approach, Hearing Before the U.S. Sen. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 116 Cong. 12 (Dec. 17, 2019) (Statement by Kemp L. Chester, U.S. Office of Nat’l 
Drug Control Pol’y), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chester%20Testimony1.pdf.  
65 Steven Jiang & Ben Wescott, China Sentences Fentanyl Drug Ring in Rare Public Trial Amid U.S. 
Talks, CNN (Nov. 7, 2019, 10:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/07/asia/china-us-fentanyl-
trump-hebei-intl-hnk/index.html (“Thursday’s sentencing was presented as the culmination of the first 
case China and the US had worked on together that led to a successful conviction.”). See also China 
Sentences 9 in Fentanyl Trafficking Case After U.S. Tip, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019, 11:00 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-11-06/china-sentences-fentanyl-us-tip. 
66 Steven Lee Myers, China Cracks Down on Fentanyl. But Is It Enough to End the U.S. Epidemic?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/world/asia/china-fentanyl-
crackdown.html.   
67 Id. (explaining that some IMF distributors “claimed to be complying with the new rules banning the 
overseas sale of synthetic opioids” while “[o]thers appeared to have shut down their operations, 
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and seized about two tons of various psychoactive substances.”68 While China’s 
attempt to crackdown on fentanyl trafficking has been considered a “positive 
step” by the United States,69 claims of victory in the battle against Chinese drug 
proliferation would be premature.70   
 Despite the efforts sketched above, this Note maintains “the measures 
China has taken have had little to no impact on curbing illicit opioid 
production.”71 China’s unilateral efforts have failed because they employ a 
lackluster regulatory enforcement framework that enables licensed 
pharmaceutical companies to divert fentanyl into illicit markets, circumventing 
national protocols.72 Jeremy Haft, a professor at Georgetown University, has 
determined China’s second-rate enforcement infrastructure fails to deter illicit 
manufacturers because, when threatened with prosecution, illicit drug operations 
simply  “shut down quickly and disappear, only to open up again in another form 
somewhere else.”73 As the U.S.-China Economic Review Commission 
explained in its 2017 annual report:  
 
Chinese law enforcement and drug investigators are unable to 
effectively regulate the high volume of drugs and chemicals 
the country produces. In many cases, the chemicals used to 
produce fentanyl and fentanyl-like products are illegally 
diverted from legitimate pharmaceutical uses, with criminals 
taking advantage of inadequate enforcement protocols to 
produce unregulated chemicals and [new psychoactive 
substances].74  
 
Consequently, unilateral efforts by China to confront distribution of IMF 
will continue to fail until the regime overhauls its regulatory infrastructure. Until 
that time, shrewd chemists will almost certainly continue to exploit China’s 
clumsy anti-drug bureaucracy to export fentanyl and fentanyl analogues abroad 
through illicit channels.75 Therefore, the current state of the opioid crisis presents 
 
 
68 Associated Press, China Bans Drug So Deadly It’s Considered a Terrorist Threat, N.Y. POST (Feb. 
16, 2017, 8:11 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/02/16/china-bans-drug-so-deadly-its-considered-a-
terrorist-threat/. Contra Battiloro, supra note 14, at 359 (“Chinese regulators have also obstructed the 
United States’ ability to conduct drug inspections by delaying visa approvals for Federal Drug 
Association (“FDA”) officials.”). 
69 Jim Carroll, ONDCP Statement on Chinese Prosecution and Sentencing of Fentanyl Traffickers and 
Producers, U.S. OFFICE OF DRUG CONTROL POL’Y (Nov. 7, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ondcp-statement-chinese-prosecution-sentencing-
fentanyl-traffickers-producers/.  
70 Myers, supra note 66 (“Experts and officials in the United States warned, however, that it was far too 
soon to declare a victory in China’s fight against fentanyl.”). 
71 Battiloro, supra note 14, at 351; Pardo, supra note 7, at 2 (“China’s export-led economic strategy and 
lack of regulatory oversight have created favorable conditions for the production and exportation of 
synthetic opioids and related chemicals.”) (emphasis added).  
72 Battiloro, supra note 14, at 355-56. 
73 David Ovalle & Jay Weaver, South Florida’s Source for Synthetic Drugs: The China Pipeline, MIAMI 
HERALD (last updated Nov. 20, 2015, 9:20 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article35417625.html. 
74 Sean O’Connor, Fentanyl: China’s Deadly Export to the United States, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. 
REV. COMM. 8 (Feb. 1, 2017). 
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a unique opportunity for an international law remedy, ideally one informed by 
drug enforcement entities in the United States and around the world. 
 
 
IV. CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS  
 
International law, principally as established by the United Nations (“U.N.”), 
has a reputation as “the cornerstone for domestic drug laws” in the United States, 
China, and elsewhere.76 Its legal framework differs from domestic drug 
enforcement because it binds nations, not individuals.77 The work of the U.N. in 
this space originated with three global treaties that govern the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (“CND”) and the International Narcotics Control Board 
(“INCB”), as well as all nations that have ratified it.78 Although the first two 
treaties established an international regulatory framework for narcotics, they 
merely “include general provisions on illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse.”79 
The U.N. would not expound on these provisions until 1988.80 
First enacted in 1961, and amended in 1972, the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs marked the first serious international attempt to regulate 
narcotics. It established a four-tiered drug schedule maintained by the INCB81 
and commanded all signatories “to limit exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, 
use and possession of drugs.”82 184 nations joined the Convention, a decision 
that required them to incorporate its provisions into their domestic laws.83 
However, the flexibility afforded by the Convention’s non-self-executing design 
undermined its purpose because member nations retained domestic legal 
 
 
76 Naomi Burke-Shyne, Joanne Csete, et al., How Drug Control Policy and Practice Undermine Access 
to Controlled Medicines, 19 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. J. 238 (2017). See also G.A. Res. 66/183 (Apr. 
3, 2012). 
77 Robert Beck, International Law and International Relations, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIAS (2018), 
http://internationalstudies.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190846626-e-406?product=oreisa#acrefore-9780190846626-e-406-bibItem-21 (last visited Feb. 
12, 2020). 
78 UNITED NATIONS, Drug Trafficking, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/transnational-
threats/drug-trafficking/ (last visited Feb. 02, 2020) (“The UN work in countering the world drug 
problem is based on three major international drug control treaties, the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs of 1961 (as amended in 1972), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 
1988. These three conventions attribute important functions to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and 
to the International Narcotics Control Board.”). See also Alexander Henderson, Portuguese Defiance: 
Analyzing the Strenuous Relationship Between Drug Decriminalization and International Law, 24 
MICH. STATE INT’L L. REV. 725, 729 (2016), 
https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1198&context=ilr.  
79 Legal Framework for Drug Trafficking, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/ psychotropics.html (last visited Feb. 02, 2020).  
80 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 78 (explaining that the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances extended the regime initiated by the 1961 and 1971 
Conventions). 
81 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, art. 2, 1961, 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf. [hereinafter 1961 Convention]. 
82 Id. at art. 4. 
83 Id. at art. 36(4) (“Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the offences to which 
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autonomy to redefine material terms, penalties, and priorities.84 Consequently, 
“it should be no surprise that, despite commitments to international legislation, 
national governments still find a way to bend the law in a manner consistent with 
their views.”85 Predictably, this unfaithful application came at the expense of the 
Convention’s ability to accomplish its intended goals and international actors 
concluded additional action would be necessary in the future. 
In 1971, the U.N. decided to update its 1961 drug control framework with 
the Convention on Psychotropic Substances. This Convention “establishe[d] an 
international control system for psychotropic substances” and “introduced 
controls over a number of synthetic drugs.”86 Although it contributed to the 
extant infrastructure established by the Single Convention, the 1971 Convention 
granted the CND new freedom to “place the substance concerned under a control 
regime, change the control regime, or free a substance from a control regime.”87 
Consequently, the CND would no longer be subject to oversight by the World 
Health Organization (“WHO”) and “[b]y the mid-1980s it was apparent that 
global drug abuse had reached unprecedented dimensions.”88 Despite its 
drafters’ admirable goals, the 1971 Convention lacked mechanisms to hold 
signatories accountable and the General Assembly tasked the CND to devise 
further measures to address this concern.89 
Three years of deliberation produced the 1988 U.N. Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.90 The crowning 
achievement of the 1988 Convention involved new drug controls that 
transcended all aspects of the transactional chain, from precursor distribution at 
the outset to post-sale money laundering.91 This Convention also redefined drug 
trafficking as a “criminal” offense,91 a noteworthy departure from the 1961 
 
 
84 David Bewley-Taylor & Martin Jelsma, Regime Change: Re-visiting the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, INT’L J. OF DRUG POL’Y 72, 76 (2011) (explaining that signatories “can impose 
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they cite “best endeavors” to comply with the stated objectives of the Convention) (emphasis added). 
85 Battiloro, supra note 14, at 364. 
86 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/psychotropics.html (last visited Feb. 07, 2020). 
87 Daniel Heilman, The International Control Of Illegal Drugs And The U.N. Treaty Regime: Preventing 
Or Causing Human Rights Violations?, 19 CARDOZO J. COMP. L. 237, 247 (2011), 
http://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/3560/cjicl_19.2_heilmann_article.pdf?seque
nce=1&isAllowed=y.  
88 Id. at 248-249. 
89 See generally William C. Gilmore et al., Commentary on The United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, E/CN.7/590 at 1-12 (1988). 
90 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 28 I.L.M. 497, Dec. 
19, 1988, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf [hereinafter 1988 Convention]. 
91 See Harmonie Michelot, Shanlin Fu, et al., Effect of Drug Precursors and Chemicals Relevant to 
Clandestine Laboratory Investigation on Plastic Bags Used for Collection and Storage, 273 FORENSIC 
SCI. INT’L 106, 107-110 (2017) (explaining precursors are compounds or solvents used to manufacture 
drugs both legal and illicit and can be difficult to detect). China is a ready distributor of fentanyl 
precursors, as well as IMF. See Armenian, supra note 31, at 3 (“The rise in the production of counterfeit 
pills and NPF-laced heroin and cocaine is expected to continue due to the ease of manufacturing and 
readily available precursors shipped from China.”). 
91 1988 Convention, supra note 90, at art. 3(2), https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf 
(“[E]ach Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under 
its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic 
drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961 
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Convention’s “punishable” offense92 language. This shift in terminology 
effectively required signatories to rewrite portions of their domestic 
counternarcotics statutes to comply with international law. The 1988 Convention 
relied upon “the underlying philosophy . . . that improving the effectiveness of 
domestic criminal justice systems in relation to drug trafficking is a precondition 
for enhanced co-operation.”93 Therefore, international law scholars viewed the 
1988 Convention as a bridge to future global collaboration that they hoped 
would hold criminal enterprises responsible for the illicit manufacturing and 
dissemination of synthetic drugs.  
Consistent with their misapplication of earlier Conventions discussed 
above, signatory nations interpreted the binding articles of the 1988 Convention 
loosely and cited licit drug manufacturing as a justification for relaxed domestic 
enforcement.94 Consequently, criminal law scholars did not observe a decrease 
in international drug use after the 1988 Convention95 and, in 1998, the U.N. 
General Assembly convened a Special Session (“UNGASS”) to address the 
issue. The UNGASS produced a political declaration that refocused international 
attention on narcotrafficking in particular.96 This Declaration “link[ed], for the 
first time, the illicit production and trafficking of drugs with terrorism and arms 
trafficking,” consistent with the U.N.’s drug enforcement trajectory.97 However, 
although the Declaration encouraged countries to submit biannual updates to the 
CND, it did not create new measures for compliance or a “formal sanction 
system”; accordingly, it has been an at best “soft instrument” in the international 
war on drugs.98 In addition to enforcement issues, increases in Afghani opium 
production scuttled what little progress the international community did make 
against global narcotrafficking.99 Therefore, charitably stated, international 
entities have struggled to effectively combat the opioid epidemic.  
The status quo international regime fails to thwart IMF traffickers because 
it lacks sufficient means to hold offending nations accountable. This dearth of 
accountability arose because the 1961 Convention and its progeny are non-self-
executing treaties designed to appease multiple nations.100 Patil Armenian and 
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97 Heilman, supra note 87, at 252. 
98 Id. 
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his colleagues at the University of California-San Francisco explain, “[s]ince the 
Single Convention is not self-executing, parties must pass laws to carry out its 
provisions, and the UNODC works with countries’ legislatures to ensure 
compliance.”101 The extent of such cooperation varies among nations and some 
signatories either lack the ability to monitor and accurately report drug 
diversion,102 or decline to enforce penalties altogether.103 Noncompliant 
countries lack an incentive to comply with extant international drug conventions 
because they do not face credible threats of enforceable sanctions. Thus, 
although the conventions ostensibly set meaningful standards, they have 
historically been—at least in practice—paper tigers. Alex Kreit, a Professor at 
Thomas Jefferson School of Law, agrees. As Kreit lamented in an interview with 
Forbes:  
 
The INCB has complained for years . . . but at the end of the 
day, that’s really all it can do. It doesn’t have any direct 
enforcement authority over parties to the Single Convention. 
All it can do is say ‘you’re out of compliance’ and, at worst, 
recommend that other treaty parties stop the import/export of 
drugs to the countries it doesn’t like.104   
 
Such lax authority also allows China to selectively enforce, and therefore 
circumvent, international law without risk of repercussion from the INCB.105 
Conversely, as explained by intellectual property attorney T. Rao Coca, bilateral 
treaties are easier to enforce than multilateral conventions because they can be 
arbitrated.106 Bilateral treaties also facilitate key law enforcement cooperation 
that may reduce the chances of material breach. They have been described as 
“the most important” part of a U.S.-China counternarcotic strategy.107 Therefore, 
any solution to the global opioid crisis must not only recognize, but also focus 
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105 Battiloro, supra note 14, at 365 (explaining that relaxed enforcement has “also provide[d] wiggle 
room for China to permit chemical companies to continue exploiting regulatory weaknesses for 
economic advantage.”). 
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upon, China as the world’s primary manufacturer of IMF, its analogues, and 




V. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
A.  BILATERAL TREATY 
 
The United States and China should adopt a bilateral treaty that would 
render legally enforceable the categorical and permanent treatment of fentanyl 
analogues as the equivalent of Schedule I controlled substances.109 The parties 
should explicitly declare their mutual intention for the treaty to self-execute.110 
Effective May 1, 2019, China “add[ed] fentanyl-related substances to a 
supplementary list of controlled narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances with 
non-medical use.”111 This action, in conjunction with DEA’s temporary 
emergency scheduling order, “has resulted in a significant decrease in direct 
Chinese-origin fentanyl-related substances being encountered in the United 
States since Fiscal Year 2019.”112 Amanda Liskamm, counsel for the Criminal 
Division at DOJ, explained in a hearing before the U.S. House of 
Representatives in January 2020 that:  
 
DEA expects savvy clandestine manufactures and traffickers 
to respond to the re-emerging gap in U.S. law by again 
producing novel fentanyl-related substances. This is the 
normal response of traffickers who wish to avoid prosecution 
and still profit from peddling poison and is consistent with 
previous attempts to circumvent reactive substance-specific 
control measures.113 
 
These synthetic analogues have ravaged the United States, claiming 
thousands of lives.114 Federal law enforcement clearly understands the need to 
 
 
108 Knierim, supra note 23, at 2. 
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Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 116 Cong. 6 (2020) (Statement by Amanda 
Liskamm, Counsel, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU08/20200128/110392/HHRG-116-JU08-Wstate-LiskammA-
20200128.pdf, (“The class of fentanyl-related substances needs to be categorically and permanently 
scheduled.”). 
110 Treaties “are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty 
itself conveys an intention that it be self-executing.” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) 
(citing Igartua–De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (C.A.1 2005)) (emphasis added). 
111 Yanping Bao, Shiqiu Meng, et al., Control of Fentanyl-Related Substances in China, THE LANCET 
(July 2019), https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lanpsy/PIIS2215-0366(19)30218-4.pdf.   
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close this loophole in U.S. law; the DOJ’s ongoing efforts to stymie synthetic 
opioid proliferation depend on it. Fifty-two state attorneys general from both 
major political parties have also voiced support for class-wide scheduling of 
fentanyl analogues.115 The proposed treaty would adopt the language of China’s 
class-wide fentanyl scheduling measure116 and permanently extend the 
temporary U.S. scheduling order.117  
 
B.  ASCENSION WOULD BE IN CHINA’S INTERESTS 
 
Claims that China would balk at this treaty are erroneous. First, while the 
treaty may establish a new layer of accountability for China to enforce its 2019 
scheduling measure, it would not create additional obligations beyond what the 
regime imposed upon itself in 2019. Rather, the proposed treaty would allow the 
United States to hold China accountable in international court for failures to 
enforce its own class-wide scheduling order.118 Because China has already 
pledged to enforce this mandate, failure to sign a treaty designed to accomplish 
that exact purpose would raise questions about the sincerity of that pledge and 
further undermine the regime’s global legitimacy. Therefore, soft power and 
reputational reasons may, perhaps on their own, be sufficient to facilitate 
China’s adoption of a treaty. 
Second, in recent months China has demonstrated a clear willingness to 
cooperate with the United States to curtail opioid proliferation.119  In 2019, 
China relied upon a tip provided by American intelligence to identify and 
subsequently prosecute Chinese nationals involved in illicit fentanyl or fentanyl-
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Act will eliminate the current loophole which keeps the controlled substance scheduling system one 
step behind those who manufacture fentanyl analogues and then introduce these fentanyl analogues 
into the opioid supply.”). 
116 Liskamm, supra note 11, at 1-2. 
117 Liskamm, supra note 109, at 3; Andrew Cass, President Signs Bill Extending Emergency 
Classification for Fentanyl Analogs, NEWS HERALD (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.news-
herald.com/news/president-signs-bill-extending-emergency-classification-for-fentanyl-
analogs/article_ecca071c-4940-11ea-832b-f36a43153559.html.   
118 Self-executing treaties are judicially enforceable because they carry the force of domestic law. See 
Stephen P. Mulligan, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, RL 32528, 
CONG. RES. SERV. 2 (last updated Sept. 19, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf (“Self-
executing treaties have a status equal to federal statute, superior to U.S. state law, and inferior to the 
Constitution.”). 
119 Cui Tiankai, Chinese Ambassador: We are Doing Our Part to Combat the Opioid Crisis, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 30, 2019, 12:21 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/09/30/chinese-
ambassador-we-are-helping-combat-opioid-crisis-column/2291440001/ (“China stands ready to 
cooperate and coordinate further with the U.S. on the highly complicated issue of fentanyl-like 
substance abuse. This must be done on the basis of mutual respect and understanding, not misplaced 
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176 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.  vol. XI:1 
related enterprises.120 The Chinese court that heard the case imposed the harshest 
sentences allowable.121 This sentencing approach should be applauded by law 
enforcement in the United States because “[a]s a result, fewer Chinese vendors 
are willing to export fentanyl products, according to DHS/Homeland Security 
Investigations’ transnational organized crime office.”122 China has also 
cooperated with the United States in other ways regarding IMF specifically. 
Celina Realuyo, a professor specializing in the study of organized crime at the 
National Defense University, explained in January 2020 that, “[t]hanks to more 
postal service scrutiny and increased U.S.-China cooperation to stem the flow of 
illicit fentanyl into the United States, the number of drug seizures involving 
high-purity fentanyl sent via mail from China dropped precipitously in 2019.”123 
This cooperation provides further indicia that China would be willing to enter a 
bilateral treaty with the United States that addresses the transboundary harms 
caused by IMF diversion and trafficking.  
 A bilateral self-executing treaty would benefit the United States in 
several ways. Most importantly, the DOJ would reassume its legal authority to 
prosecute traffickers of fentanyl analogues, when traceable to China, just as if 
Congress had permanently incorporated such analogues into Schedule I. 
Consequently, the treaty could facilitate efforts by the DOJ to focus on the 
geographical source of IMF and, by virtue of territorial-effects jurisdiction,124 
prosecute any illicit manufacturers China does not—a necessary backstop. Even 
with China’s 2019 scheduling order, the regime’s enforcement capabilities 
remain at best lackluster. Thus, “[u]nilateral action will have no influence on an 
industry that remains a step ahead of the law.”125 Fortunately for China, the 
United States may be in a position to help. Alex Palmer, an investigative 
journalist, explains: 
 
The agency responsible for overseeing production of drugs and 
detecting malfeasance in China is understaffed and 
overwhelmed: As of 2017, there were around 2,000 inspectors 
at the agency, and they conducted a total of only 751 
inspections that year, a minuscule figure compared with the 
enormousness of the industry. In the United States, law 
enforcement and prosecutors have the tools to react quickly to 
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(Nov. 7, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/07/777173066/china-jails-9-in-fentanyl-
trafficking-case-that-began-with-a-u-s-tip. 
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Thus, the proposed treaty would serve the national interests of both the 
United States and China. The United States would be able to hold Chinese 
chemists accountable for illicit diversion of fentanyl analogues and China would 
enjoy drug enforcement assistance in its purported crackdown on synthetic 
opioids. Predictably, Chinese chemists would become much less likely to 
continue illicit diversion practices.127 For example, as one such chemist 
explained in February 2019: “Anything [China] schedules, we don’t sell. As 
long as it is scheduled, we won’t sell it. If it’s not scheduled, we can sell it.”128 
Therefore, one might infer that the downward trend in fentanyl diversion that 
emerged in the wake of China’s 2019 class-wide scheduling order would 
continue with additional law enforcement scrutiny by the United States and 
international partners. 
Although the United States has been hit the hardest by opioid overdoses 
among developed nations, it is not alone.129 The proposed treaty, in conjunction 
with other forms of bilateral cooperation, promises the missing link in 
accountability to ensure that China honors its 2019 pledge to control fentanyl 
analogues, especially in a world which “has taught Beijing that faking self-
accountability while contesting criticism is a safe strategy.”130 A bilateral treaty 
between the United States and China would also benefit other nations that have 
been ravaged by transboundary fentanyl trafficking. When less illicit fentanyl 
flows from its primary source, transboundary harm to residents of other nations 
predictably decreases.131  
 
C. DOMESTIC LAW ALONE INSUFFICIENT  
 
Criticisms alleging that Congress can solve this crisis on its own are 
misplaced for three reasons. First, although the United States temporarily 
extended its Schedule I classification of fentanyl analogues on February 6, 2020, 
it did so only for fifteen months, at which time Congress must revisit the 
question.132 Such temporary scheduling is inadequate because it routinely 
subjects DOJ drug control efforts to the uncertainty wrought by turbulent 
political tides by demanding that the agency perennially devote resources to 
lobbying for the renewal of the same policy.133 This process not only squanders 
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American taxpayer dollars in needless bureaucratic squabbles, but it also risks 
the declassification of fentanyl analogues after fifteen months.134 Such 
declassification would deprive the DOJ of necessary prosecutorial authority to 
bring narcotraffickers to justice.  
Second, a bilateral treaty promises territorial-effects jurisdiction that would 
enable the prosecution of chemists in China who profit from drug diversion that 
harms Americans.135 Domestic law alone cannot realize this benefit and, because 
most illicit fentanyl originates in China, it would inevitably be less effective 
because it lacks jurisdiction over the source. Moreover, a unilateral solution 
would forego diplomatic opportunities to cooperate with Chinese law 
enforcement. Therefore, whereas domestic law can mitigate the symptoms of the 
opioid crisis, a bilateral treaty would be of special benefit because it proposes to 
address the problem at its source.  
Finally, ratification of the proposed treaty could occur with a simple two-
thirds majority vote in the U.S. Senate.136 The Senate unanimously renewed 
temporary IMF analogue scheduling in January 2020 for fifteen months,137 
unlike the House of Representatives where 88 members opposed the measure.138 
While the Republican Senate may have preferred to permanently schedule 
fentanyl analogues, prudence prevented it from doing so. Pressed against the 
February 6, 2020 deadline, the Senate had no choice but to “water down” 
legislation that would have permanently scheduled fentanyl analogues139 to 
“appease Democrats’ concerns”.140 Given the now bipartisan support for 
permanent scheduling in the Senate,141 it appears likely that the chamber would 
ratify a bilateral treaty that accomplishes this purpose—particularly when 
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senators need not appease the ultra-progressive political factions that exert an 





A bilateral self-executing treaty between the United States and China would 
mark a step forward for diplomacy between the two superpowers and serve 
longstanding international drug enforcement interests by targeting fentanyl 
analogues at their distribution point. While some literature on this subject 
recommends more of the same failed multinational conventions,142 the 
alternative proposed here is novel for its tailored focus and simple philosophy: 
target the source and control the flow. Moreover, 2021 presents a unique 
opportunity for drug control efforts to acquire a place of prominence in U.S.-
China relations, as evinced by new prosecutorial cooperation that has emerged 
from recent trade talks.143  
This Note recognizes that its proposed treaty promises only a first step in 
global efforts to combat transboundary fentanyl proliferation. This proposal does 
not market itself as—nor would it be appropriately labeled—a silver bullet in 
the global “War on Drugs” (so-called). Additional measures would also be 
important for the treaty to yield optimal results. The United States and China, in 
conjunction with international partners, should also consider regulation of 
fentanyl precursors, many of which originate in China and are subsequently 
disseminated to American consumers through Mexico.144 Accordingly, federal 
law enforcement would benefit from additional cooperation between DOJ 
entities and the Mexican Government to control transboundary trafficking in 
fentanyl, its analogues, precursors, and other drugs.145 Finally, and most 
importantly, China must take clear action to close loopholes in its drug control 
regime. Kai Pflug, a consultant in the Chinese chemical industry, explained to 
the New York Times that drug diversion will persist in some variety until China 
ramps up supervision over its chemical industry.146 Research into such reforms 
must occur without delay. 
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obligations and reduces opportunity to exploit loopholes.”). 
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Synthetic opioids marked a turning point in the opioid crisis, both in 
America and around the world. Despite best efforts and noble intentions by the 
international community and the United States to curtail the epidemic, illicit 
opioid abuse has only worsened in recent years with an estimated over 30,000 
deaths directly attributable to synthetic opioid overdoses in 2018.147 Recent trade 
talks between the United States and China, combined with DOJ’s interest in 
class-wide scheduling, has rendered the present a pristine opportunity for 
transnational cooperation on this important issue. Unlike many challenges of our 
day, the opioid crisis affects people around the world and from among every 
social class, from renowned musicians like Prince148 to everyday Americans 
such as Adam Moser. The urgency of this crisis presents a unique opportunity 
for bipartisanship in America149 and global cooperation among rival 
superpowers.150 This Note proposes a solution that would not only revolutionize 
the public policy conversation about synthetic opioids, but also chart a new and 
sustainable path forward. Adoption of the recommendations herein discussed 
would optimize diplomacy between the United States and China, potentially 
saving countless lives.  
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